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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PROVO CITY CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. 
DAVID G. CANNON, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
: Case No. 981194-CA 
: Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(1992 as Amended). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in finding that Utah Code 
Annotated Section 76-5-109 does not require physical impairment 
to a child before an individual can be convicted of child abuse? 
Statutory interpretation is a question of law reviewed for 
"correctness" with no particular deference accorded to the trial 
court. State v. Fixel, 945 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah App. 1997). 
This issue was preserved during argument at trial (R. 41 at 
22-24). 
1 
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CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The text of Utah Code Annotated Section 76-5-109 is set 
forth in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
David G. Cannon appeals from a conviction of Child Abuse, a 
Class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated Section 
76-5-109. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Trial Court 
Cannon was charged by Information with Child Abuse, a Class 
B misdemeanor, in Fourth District Court, Provo Department, on or 
about January 7, 1997 (R. 1). On January 23, 1998, a bench trial 
was held before the Honorable Gary D. Stott, at which Cannon was 
convicted of Child Abuse, a class A misdemeanor (R. 20, 41). On 
March 23, 1998, Cannon was sentenced to 80 days in the Utah 
County Jail and ordered to pay a $740.00 fine (R. 26) . The 
sentence was stayed pending appeal (Id.). On March 25, 1998, 
Cannon filed a notice of appeal and this action commenced (R. 
38) . 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
In March of 1996 Cannon and his wife lived in a third floor 
apartment located approximately at 401 North 900 East in Provo 
2 
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(Tr. at 4-6). Angel Ivins and Penny Cooper also lived in the 
same apartment complex on the second floor(Tr. at 4-6, 11-12). 
On the afternoon of March 13, 1996, Ivins was standing on 
her doorstep and she observed Cannon's wife, Cami, come down to 
the second floor to get some mail (Tr. at 6). At this time Ivins 
observed Cannon on the third floor approximately fifteen to 
twenty feet away (Tr. at 7). Ivins testified that she observed 
Cannon holding Christine Armstrong's eight or nine month-old 
child over the third story rail (Tr. at 8). Cannon was holding 
the child underneath his armpits (Tr. at 9). Ivins testified 
that she then heard Cannon's wife tell him to "stop" and Cannon 
removed the child from over the rail (Tr. at 9). 
On the afternoon of March 13, 1996, Penny Cooper was 
likewise standing in front of her second story apartment (Tr. at 
13). Cooper testified that she observed Cannon on the third 
floor approximately twenty to twenty-five feet from Cooper (Tr. 
at 13). Cooper testified that she also saw Cannon old the baby 
over the rail for "just a few minutes" (Tr. at 14). Cooper also 
testified that Cannon's wife was standing by her and that when 
Cami told Cannon to "stop", he stopped and pulled the baby 
towards him (Tr. at 15). Cooper testified that the baby looked 
scared(Tr. at 16). Cooper testified that she didn't "know if 
[Cannon] thought it was a joke" but that she "just didn't agree 
with what [she] saw" (Tr. at 14). 
3 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Cannon held a nine month-old child over a third story 
railing for a few moments. The child received no injuries or 
physical impairment. Cannon was convicted of child abuse, a 
class A misdemeanor, because the trial court interpreted Utah 
Code Annotated Section 76-5-109 to prohibit any act by the 
defendant which could conceivably have imperiled the child's 
health or welfare. Cannon asserts that this interpretation is in 
error and that the statute requires, at the very least, that the 
child's physical condition be impaired by the defendant's 
conduct. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 76-5-109 AND THAT 
ERRONEOUS INTERPRETATION RESULTED IN CANNON'S CONVICTION 
Cannon was charged with Child Abuse, a class A misdemeanor, 
in violation of Utah Code Annotated Section 76-5-109. At trial 
the evidence established that for a few minutes Cannon held a 
nine month-old baby over the third story railing of an apartment 
complex before being instructed to stop, which he did (Tr. at 4-
9, 13-16). One witness also testified that the baby looked 
scared (Tr. at 16). 
4 
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At trial, Cannon argued that he should be acquitted because 
the plain language of Section 76-5-109 requires that he must have 
inflicted a physical injury upon the baby in order to be 
convicted of child abuse (Tr. at 22). The City argued that 
Cannon need only create a condition which "imperils the child's 
health or welfare" in order to be guilty of child abuse (Tr. at 
22-23) . 
The trial court adopted the City's position holding that 
"physical injury" can include any condition which could 
conceivably imperil the child's health or welfare (Tr. at 24). 
Accordingly, because placing the child over the railing could 
have imperiled his health or welfare, the trial court convicted 
Cannon of child abuse and sentenced to 80 days in jail (Tr. at 
24; R. 26). 
Cannon asserts that the trial court erroneously interpreted 
Utah Code Annotated Section 76-5-109!s requirement of "physical 
injury" and that erroneous interpretation resulted in his 
conviction. Issues of statutory interpretation are reviewed for 
correctness with no deference accorded the trial court. State v. 
Fixel, 945 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah App. 1997). Moreover, on issues 
of statutory construction, this Court should look first to the 
"plain language" of the statute. State v. Winward, 907 P.2d 
5 
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1188, 1190 (Utah App. 1995)(citations omitted). In addition, 
"each term in a statute should be interpreted according to its 
ususal and commonly accepted meaning." State v. Paul, 8 60 P.2d 
992, 993 (Utah App. 1993). 
Utah Code Annotated Section 76-5-109(3) states that "any 
person who inflicts upon a child physical injury... is guilty of 
an offense as follows: (a) if done intentionally or knowingly, 
the offense is a class A misdemeanor; (b) if done recklessly, the 
offense is a class B misdemeanor; (c) if done with criminal 
negligence, the offense is a class C misdemeanor." Therefore, 
the requisite statutory elements for child abuse are criminal 
intent coupled with the infliction of physical injury upon a 
child. 
Utah Code Annotated Section 76-5-109(1)(b) defines "physical 
injury" as "an injury to or condition of a child which impairs 
the physical condition of the child, including: (i) a bruise or 
other contusion of the skin; (ii) a minor laceration or abrasion; 
(iii) failure to thrive or malnutrition; or (iv) any other 
condition which imperils the child's health or welfare and which 
is not a serious physical injury as defined in this section."1 
In State v. Paul, 860 P.2d 992 (Utah 1993), the defendant, 
*An individual who inflicts "serious physical injury" on a 
child is guilty of either a second degree felony, third degree 
felony, or class A misdemeanor depending upon the requisite 
criminal intent. Utah Code Annotated Section 76-5-109(2). 
6 
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while an inmate in the Salt Lake County Jail, allegedly spit on a 
correctional officer and was charged with assault on a 
correctional officer. This Court affirmed the trial court's 
dismissal of the charge because the statute in question required 
that the inmate "throw" material at the officer and the plain 
meaning of "throw" does not include spitting. 
Similarly, Utah Code Annotated Section 76-5-109(3) requires 
the infliction of a physical injury upon a child prior to a 
conviction of child abuse. Utah Code Annotated Section 76-5-
109(1) (b) defines "physical injury" as some injury which "impairs 
the physical condition of the child." Merriam Webster's 
Collegiate Dictionary, Ninth Edition defines "condition" as "a 
state of being" or "a defective state of health" (p. 240); and it 
defines "to impair" as "to damage or make worse by" (p. 581). 
Cannon asserts that these definitions are the most commonly 
accepted meanings of these terms and that this Court should 
interpret Utah Code Annotated Section 76-5-109 accordingly. 
The trial court erred, Cannon asserts, in holding that the 
plain language of Utah Code Annotated Section 7 6-5-109 did not 
require an actual impairment to the child's physical condition 
and that any act of the defendant which could have conceivably 
affected the child's health or welfare was sufficient to convict 
an individual of child abuse. In this case there was no evidence 
7 
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presented at trial which established any physical injury to the 
child or any impairment to the physical condition of the child. 
Accordingly, Cannon asks that this Court hold that the trial 
court's interpretation of Utah Code Annotated Section 76-5-109 
was in error and that his conviction should be reversed.2 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Cannon asks that this Court reverse his conviction for child 
abuse because his conduct did not result in either physical 
injury to the child nor was the child's physical condition 
impaired by his conduct. 
DATED this / J day of January, 1999. 
•THOMAS H. MEANS 
Counsel for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Brief Of Appellant to Rick Romney, 
Deputy Provo City Attorney, P.O. Box 1849, Provo, Utah 84603 this 
/ / day of January, 1999. 
2In the alternative, Cannon asks that this Court find that 
Cannon's conduct was at most, "reckless" and more probably 
"negligent" and that his conviction should be reduced to a class B 
or C misdemeanor. 
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ADDENDA 
9 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
76-5-108 CRIMINAL CODE 
(2) Under Subsection (1) any activity as described upon which the initiation, 
admission into, affiliation with, or continued membership in an organization is 
directly or indirectly conditioned is presumed to be "forced." 
(3) An actor who recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally hazes another is 
guilty of a: 
(a) class B misdemeanor if there are no aggravating circumstances; 
(b) class A misdemeanor if the act of hazing involves the operation or 
other use of a motor vehicle; 
(c) third degree felony if the act of hazing involves the use of a deadly or 
dangerous weapon; 
(d) third degree felony if the hazing results in serious bodily injury to a 
person; or 
(e) second degree felony if hazing under Subsection (d) involves the use 
of a deadly or dangerous weapon. 
(4) A person who in good faith reports or participates in reporting of an 
alleged hazing is not subject to any civil or criminal liability regarding the 
reporting. 
History: C. 1953,76-5-107.5, enacted by L. 
1989, ch. 59, § 1. 
76-5-108. Protective orders restraining abuse of another 
— Violation. 
Any person who has been restrained from abusing or contacting another or 
ordered to vacate a dwelling or remain away from the premises of the other's 
residence, employment, or other place as ordered by the court under a 
protective order or ex parte protective order issued under Title 30, Chapter 6, 
or Title 78, Chapter 3a, who violates that order after having been properly 
served with it, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
History: C. 1953, 76-5-108, enacted by L. as ordered by the court under" for "another, or 
1979, ch. I l l , § 10; 1984, ch. 12, § 1; 1991, who has been ordered to vacate a dwelling by," 
ch. 75, § 4; 1993, ch. 137, § 12. inserted "or ex parte protective order," and 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- made a minor stylistic change, 
ment, effective April 29, 1991, substituted "or The 1993 amendment, effective May 3,1993, 
contacting another or ordered to vacate a dwell- substituted "class A misdemeanor" for "class B 
ing or remain away from the premises of the misdemeanor." 
other's residence, employment, or other place 
76-5-109. Child abuse. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Child" means a human being who is 17 years of age or less. 
(b) "Physical injury" means an injury to tor condition of a child which 
impairs] the physical condition of the child, including: 
(I) a bruise or other contusion of the skin; 
(ii) a minor laceration or abrasion; 
(iii) failure to thrive or malnutrition; or 
(iv) any other condition which imperils the child's health or welfare 
and which is not a serious physical injury as defined in this section. 
(c) "Serious physical injury* means any physical injury or set of injuries 
which seriously impairs the child's health, or which involves physical 
110 
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OFFENSES AGAINST THE PERSON 76-5-109 
illy hazes another j 8 " j 
ing circumstances* 
Ives the operation or n 
the use of a deadly or A 
)us bodily injury to a 
i (d) involves the use 
use of another 
torture or causes serious emotional harm to the child, or which involves a 
substantial risk of death to the child, including: 
(i) fracture of any bone or bones; 
(ii) intracranial bleeding, swelling or contusion of the brain, 
whether caused by blows, shaking, or causing the child's head to 
impact with an object or surface; 
(iii) any burn, including burns inflicted by hot water, or those 
caused by placing a hot object upon the skin or body of the child; 
(iv) any injury caused by use of a deadly or dangerous weapon; 
(v) any combination of two or more physical injuries inflicted by the 
same person, either at the same time or on different occasions; 
(vi) any damage to internal organs of the body; 
(vii) any conduct toward a child which results in severe emotional 
harm, severe developmental delay or retardation, or severe impair-
'* ment of the child's ability to function; 
(viii) any injury which creates a permanent disfigurement or pro-
tracted loss or impairment of the function of a bodily member, limb, or 
; organ; 
* (ix) any conduct which causes a child to cease breathing, even if 
resuscitation is successful following the conduct; or 
^ (x) any conduct which results in starvation or failure to thrive or 
;; malnutrition that jeopardizes the child's life. 
(2) Any person who inflicts upon a child serious physical injury or, having 
the care or custody of such child, causes or permits another to inflict serious 
physical injury upon a child is guilty of an offense as follows: 
L. (a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a felony of the 
k j<. second degree; 
(b) if done recklessly, the offense is a felony of the third degree; 
< sjf' (c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a class A misde-
*jfo meanor. 
* hv (3) Any person who inflicts upon a child physical injury or, having the care 
jor custody of such child, causes or permits another to inflict physical injury 
upon a child is guilty of an offense as follows: 
,r: (a) if done intentionally or knowingly, the offense is a class A misde-
1 ; meanor; 
h (b) if done recklessly, the offense is a class B misdemeanor; 
(c) if done with criminal negligence, the offense is a class C misde-
i meanor. 
4
 r (4) Criminal actions under this section may be prosecuted in the county or 
v: ^district where the offense is alleged to have been committed, where the 
' ^existence of the offense is discovered, where the victim resides, or where the 
defendant resides. 
it 
I • 
M fr 
t>, History: C. 1953, 76-5-109, enacted by L. 
£* < 1981, ch. 64, § 1; 1992, ch. 192, § 1. 
'V^t Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend-
&E ment, effective April 27, 1992, subdivided and 
^rewrote Subsection (1Kb), substituting the 
•,--%fc*lM*8ent language for former similar provisions 
" - ? & f ? T t r a n s ferring the rest to Subsection (l)(c); in 
^Subsection (l)(c), designated the existing pro-
visions as Subsection (lXcXviii), except for a 
reference to "substantial risk of death" now in 
the introductory language, and added the rest 
of the subsection; in Subsections (2) and (3), 
substituted "or" for "and" after "having the 
care"; and made stylistic changes. 
Cross-References. — Child abuse and ne-
glect prevention and treatment, § 62A-4a-301 
et seq. 
Reporting requirements, § 62A-4a-403. 
: ! i 
H I '.'it 
• 1 r . 
n I* 
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3 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
(Electronically recorded on January 23, 1998) 
THE COURT: Next item is that of City vs. 
Cannon, David Cannon present? Are you Mr. Cannon? 
MR. MEANS: Your Honor, I'm on that matter, 
and I'll be right back in. 
THE COURT: Sure. Are you ready Mr. Means? 
MR. MEANS: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Romney? 
MR. ROMNEY: I believe so, your Honor, yes. 
THE COURT: You may go ahead, gentlemen. 
MR. ROMNEY: Thank you, your Honor. We'll 
call Angel Ivins. 
COURT CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the 
testimony you are about to give in this case now 
pending before the Court will be the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 
THE WITNESS: I do. 
ANGEL IVINS 
having been first duly sworn, 
testifies as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. ROMNEY: 
Q. Would you state your name, please, for the 
record? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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A. It's Angel June Ivins. 
Q. What city do you live in? 
A. Provo. 
Q. I'm going to call your attention, ma'am, to 
the date of March 13, 1996. That's a long time ago, 
coming up to a couple of years, and ask you if on that 
date you lived at 401 North 900 East? 
A. I did. 
Q. Do you still live there? 
A. I sure do. 
Q. And you still live in the same apartment 
there that you did then? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What apartment is that? 
A. Twenty. 
Q. Tell us, if you will, that building, how is 
it configured, and where you live in the building. 
A. Well, it's kind of like square, kind of, you 
know. 
Q. Would it be a U-shaped apartment complex? 
A. Yeah, it's U-shaped, and I'm in the straight 
part in the back. 
Q. So you're in the part furthest west on the 
U-shape of the complex? 
A. Yes. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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5 
Q. 
levels? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Where is your apartment, on which of the 
Second floor. 
How many levels are there? 
Three. 
Three? 
Uh-huh. 
Let me ask you, ma'am, are you acquainted 
' with a David Cannon? 
A. 
Q. 
Yes. 
Would you recognize that person if he were 
here today? 
A. 
Q. 
1 is he the 
' A. 
Q. 
A. 
floor. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
He's there to the left. 
Seated by the attorney at the other table, 
fellow in the blue shirt? 
Yes. 
How do you know David Cannon? 
He was a neighbor, he lived on the third 
Does he still live there? 
No, he doesn't. 
Are you acquainted with Christine Armstrong? 
Yes, I am. 
And her children? 
Yes, I am. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 Q. Let me call your attention, then, to that 
2 date we talked about, March 13, 1996, and ask you if 
3 on that date you observed Mr. Cannon in company with 
4 any of the children of Ms. Armstrong. 
5 A. Yes, I did. 
6 Q. Ma'am, if you will, tell us when that 
7 occurred more or less on that day, what you observed. 
8 A. Well, I was standing outside next to my 
9 door, and Cami was going down -- his wife, I don't 
10 know if they're still married or not. 
11 Q. Cannon's wife? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. Was where? 
14 A. She was walking down on my level to go down 
15 to get some mail. 
16 Q. And did you mention where Mr. Cannon lived, 
17 on which level? 
18 A. He was on the third floor. I don't remember 
19 exactly what apartment number it was, but it was on 
20 the third floor. 
21 Q. And then you left your apartment and were 
22 standing on the (inaudible)? 
23 A. I was standing -- I was just like walking 
24 out my door and I was standing on the doorstep there. 
25 Q. And his wife was on your same level, you 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
indicated was going to get some mail? 
A. Yes, she was going to get some mail. 
Did you see Mr. Cannon from where you were Q. 
located? 
A. 
Q. 
saw him. 
A. 
Q. 
Yes, I did. 
Tell us, if you will, where it was that you 
He was on the third floor. 
How far away from you in distance would you 
say, in terms of this courtroom. 
A. Maybe 15 feet, 20 feet. 
Q. Close? 
Pretty close. 
Did you have obstructions to your ability to 
A. 
Q. 
see him? 
A. 
Q. 
No, I didn't. 
What did you notice about him? Tell us, if 
you will, if you remember what time of day it was. 
A. It was like afternoon, mid afternoon. I 
don't exactly know what time it was because it's been 
a long time. 
Q. Was it still daylight? 
A. Yes, it was. 
Q. How many people were around you? 
A. Well, Penny was outside, and his wife was 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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1 outside, and a couple of other witnesses -- I mean 
2 another witness that had seen it is not here right 
3 now, but she was outside, too. 
4 Q. How many people were around Mr. Cannon? 
5 A. Children were like right next to him. 
6 Q. How many children? 
7 A. Amber and Malcolm. 
8 Q. You've indicated that he lived on the third 
9 floor; is that right? 
10 A. Uh-huh. 
11 Q. How far would it be in your estimation in 
12 distance from the third floor to the ground? 
13 A. I'm not really good at estimating. I would 
14 say at least 15 to 20 feet, it could be more. 
15 Q. What happened as you looked up and observed 
16 Mr. Cannon? 
17 A. He was hanging Malcolm over the rail, and 
18 his wife had said, "No, David, don't. Stop." 
19 Q. Let me stop you there. Malcolm, who is 
20 Malcolm? 
21 A. Christine Armstrong's son. 
22 Q. And at that time, ma'am, in March of 1996, 
23 how old was Malcolm? 
24 A. I believe eight or nine months. 
25 Q. A little baby? 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
9 
A, Yes. 
Q. You've indicated that Mr. Cannon was hanging 
Malcolm over the rail. Tell us specifically what you 
mean by that. What was he doing with the baby? 
A. He had him underneath his arms, and he was 
literally just hanging him over like this. 
Q. What was his wife doing, Cami Cannon, what 
did she say? 
A. She said, "No, David, don't. Stop," like 
that. 
Q. What happened next? 
A. I don't really exactly remember. I think he 
brought the baby back from over the rail. 
Q. How long did this take? How long over what 
time period did this occur? 
A. Probably a few minutes. 
Q. What was your response, ma'am, when you 
looked up and saw him hanging the baby, Malcolm, over 
the rail? 
A. I was really shocked because I wouldn't even 
dream of doing something like that. Just playing 
around it would not be something funny, you know. 
Q. What was underneath the baby as he was being 
hung out over the railing? 
A. Nothing. 
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I 
Q. What happened then? 
A. He had brought the baby back over the rail, 
and I guess they went back into the apartment. 
Q. What did you do then? 
A. I was completely shocked. 
Q. Why? 
A. Because to see something like that. I mean 
if he were to fall, there's no way that baby would 
have made it. I was just totally shocked. 
Q. What happened next? 
A. I had talked with Christine about it when 
she came home, and from there I believe she called the 
police. 
Q. Did you have further interaction with the 
police as to what you had seen that day? 
A. I think I gave them a statement, but I'm not 
for sure. 
MR. ROMNEY: That's all the questions that I 
have of the witness, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Wait just a moment. Mr. Means 
might have some questions for you. 
MR. MEANS: No questions, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right, thank you, ma'am. 
Mr. Romney, your next witness? 
MR. ROMNEY: We call Ms. Cooper, your Honor, 
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Penny Cooper. 
COURT CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the 
testimony you are about to give in this case now 
pending before the Court will be the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 
THE WITNESS: I do. 
PENNY COOPER 
having been first duly sworn, 
testifies as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. ROMNEY: 
Q. Ma'am, good morning, would you state your 
name, please, for the record? 
A. Penny Lynn Cooper. 
Q. Are you a resident of Provo? 
A. Yes, I am. 
Q. I want to call your attention to the same 
date we have talked about with the other witness, that 
being the 13th of March of 1996. Were you a resident 
of 401 North 900 East on that date? 
A. Yes, I was. 
Q. Is that the apartment complex that's been 
described to us by Ms. Ivins? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. U-shaped complex? 
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A. 
Q* 
time? 
A, 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
distance 
A. 
Q. 
ground, 
Yes. 
Which apartment did you live in at that 
Seventeen. 
Which level is that on? 
Second. 
Is that a three level apartment complex? 
Uh-huh. 
In your estimation, ma'am, how far in 
is it from the top level to the ground? 
About 3 0 feet. 
And what separates that level from the 
what protective devices, if any? Is there a 
guard rail? 
A. 
o. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
here? 
. A, 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Just a guard rail, yeah. 
So you lived on the second floor? 
Uh-huh. 
Are you familiar with a David Cannon? 
Yes, I am. 
Would you recognize that person if he were 
Yes, I do. 
Is he here? 
Yes, he is. 
Point him out, please. 
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A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
' 13, 19S 
on that 
A 
Q 
A. 
to the 
apartm<= 
Q. 
A. 
! feet. 
Q. 
Right there. 
Next to Mr. Means in the blue shirt? 
Uh-huh. 
And how are you familiar with him? 
He lived in our apartment complex. 
Which level did he live on? 
Third floor. 
Calling your attention to that date, March 
)6, did you have occasion to observe Mr. Cannon 
: date? 
Uh-huh. 
Where was he and where were you? 
I was in front of my apartment complex next 
guard rail, and he was up by -- in front of his 
mt next to the guard rail. 
Which was how far away from you? 
On a flat surface it would be about 20 to 25 
Did you have anything obscuring your view of 
Mr. Cannon or what he was doing? 
A. 
Q. 
Huh-uh. 
Describe, if you will, the daylight 
conditions and how many people were around, what was 
happens 
A. 
.rig. 
It was between probably approximately 3:30, 
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1 4 o'clock. 
2 Q. Was it daylight? 
3 A. It was still daylight, and there wasn't very 
4 many people around. It was just me and a few children 
5 and a couple of adults. 
6 Q. What did you see happen? 
7 A. I seen the person in question hang--
8 Q. Well, the person in question, who are you 
9 talking about? 
10 A. David Cannon, over the railing I seen him 
11 hang Malcolm Bailey over the railing by -- underneath 
12 his arms in front of his apartment. 
13 Q. How did he do that? Describe what he did. 
14 A. Pretty much just picked him up and held him 
15 like this over the railing. 
16 Q. How long did that take? 
17 A. It was probably just a few minutes. 
18 Q. What was the defendant, Mr. Cannon, doing at 
19 that time? 
20 A. I don't know if he thought it was a joke or 
21 if -- I don't really know the mental state he was in 
22 at the time, but I just didn't agree with what I saw. 
23 Q. You indicate you didn't agree, what was your 
24 response? What did you do? 
25 A. I was in shock, and if it would have been my 
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son I probably would have went up there and got the 
baby from him. 
Q. Why? 
A. Because I don't think that's right, jokingly 
or otherwise. 
Q. What happened then? 
A. His neighbor next to him grabbed the baby 
when they came back from the rail and took him into 
the apartment. 
Q. The neighbor that took the child--
A. The witness that isn't here. 
Q. And then what happened? 
A. Cami went upstairs. Cami was standing by me 
when all this was happening. She had just barely came 
from the mailbox. 
Q. So she was by you when you were watching 
David? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Uh-huh. 
Did she see it? 
Yes, she did. 
What happened as she saw it? 
She said, "David, don't. Stop." 
What did he do? 
He stopped, he pulled the baby back over the 
railing towards him. 
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Q. So then what happened next? 
A. I went into my apartment because I just 
couldn't believe what I had seen, and that was pretty 
much all I saw. 
Q. How old was this baby? 
A. About eight to ten months, and was -- I 
don't know if he still is -- a chronic asthma patient. 
Q. Did you know his physical condition at that 
time? 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. What was it? 
A. He looked pretty scared. I don't know at 
the time after he had pulled him over the railing if 
he was in shock or not. 
MR. ROMNEY: That's all the questions I have 
of the lady, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Means? 
MR. MEANS: No questions. 
THE COURT: Thank you, ma'am. 
Anything else, Mr. Romney? 
MR. ROMNEY: Your Honor, I'm going to see if 
Cami Cannon is here, or Tracy Wotecki. We'll call 
Sergeant Hodgson. 
COURT CLERK: You do solemnly swear that the 
testimony you are about to give in this case now 
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pending before the Court will be the truth, the whole 
truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 
THE WITNESS: I do. 
GARY HODGSON 
having been first duly sworn, 
testifies as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. ROMNEY: 
Q. Sergeant Hodgson, for the record, state your 
name and occupation, please. 
A. Gary Hodgson, I'm a police officer for Provo 
City. 
Q. How long have you been working for Provo 
City? 
A. Over 13 years. 
Q. You were a police officer, then, in that 
capacity on the 13th of March of 1996? 
A. I was. 
Q. Officer, are you familiar with David Cannon? 
A. I am. 
Q. Would you recognize him if he were here? 
A. Yes, he's seated at the defense table next 
to Mr. Means. 
Q. How are you familiar with him? 
A. I met him as a result of this investigation. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
18 
Q. As to this particular incident that the 
witnesses have described, Sergeant Hodgson, when did 
you become aware of it? 
A. I became aware of it on April the 23rd of 
1996. 
Q. How was it that you became aware of it? 
A. Christine Armstrong, along with a couple of 
other ladies, came into my office. 
Q. Christine Armstrong is whom as to this case? 
A. The mother of Malcolm Bailey. 
Q. She came into your office accompanied by 
whom? 
A. She came in with Penny Cooper and Tracy 
Wotecki. 
Q. For what purpose? 
A. To discuss with me some allegations 
regarding what they believed to be inappropriate 
conduct by Mr. Cannon. 
Q. Did any of those allegations center on the 
event described here today? 
A. It did. 
Q. What did you do, Sergeant Hodgson, by way of 
your investigation? 
A. I talked with the witnesses pursuant to this 
particular victim. Of course, I couldn't talk to the 
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child, he was born in 1995, June the 6th, to be exact. 
Q. So at this event would have been how old? 
A. At this particular time he would have been 
nine months, approximately. 
Q. You couldn't talk with the victim, then what 
did you do to investigate? 
A. Well, I talked to the witnesses in the case, 
also talked to Mr. Cannon. 
Q. After speaking with the witnesses, when was 
it that you talked to Mr. Cannon? 
A. Let me refer to my report for the date of 
the interview, May the 24th of 1996. 
Q. What were the circumstances of your visiting 
with him? Where was he, where were you? 
A. He came down to my office at the police 
department. 
Q. Was he in custody? 
A. He was not. 
Q. Was he advised that he was not? 
A. He was. 
Q. He spoke to you voluntarily? 
A. He did. 
Q. Did you discuss this incident that we've 
talked about here this morning? 
A. We did. 
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Q. What in particular? 
A. Specifically regarding what the allegations 
were regarding this particular case. 
Q. What did you tell him as to what they were? 
A. Well, we discussed -- as I recall, I told 
him that there was allegations that there had been 
some inappropriate conduct with Ms. Armstrong's 
children, further on this particular case that there 
was an allegation that he had placed a young child in 
danger. 
Q. Did you describe what you knew about it, the 
circumstances? 
A. As we continued through the interview I did. 
Q. Did you invite his response? 
A. I did. 
Q. What did he say? 
A, To the best of my knowledge he denied any 
type of activity as he had been accused of. 
Q. You had conducted an investigation by 
talking to the witnesses; is that correct? 
A. I had. 
Q. At the conclusion of that, your 
investigation into the incident and talking with Mr. 
Cannon, did you prefer charges against Mr. Cannon? 
A. I screened the case with yourself, and 
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charges 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
to you? 
A. 
hanging 
complex, 
were filed, yes. 
For what? 
Child abuse. 
Based on what facts that you had available 
Based on the fact 
the victim over the 
that he had placed 
danger of physical abuse --
physical 
Q. 
injury. 
that by his actions of 
railing of the apartment 
the child in imminent 
or physical danger, 
Did you conduct any other investigation into 
this case? 
A. 
Q. 
today? 
A. 
For what circumstances? 
As to the incident 
Not that I recall. 
MR. ROMNEY: Thank 
questions I have of Sergeant 
that we've described here 
. you, that's all the 
Hodgson, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Means? 
MR. MEANS: No questions, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank 
Anything else, Mr. 
MR. ROMNEY: If I 
your Honor. 
THE COURT: Sure. 
you, sir. 
Romney? 
could just have a moment, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
22 
1 MR. ROMNEY: That's the extent of the 
2 testimony that we have, your Honor. 
3 THE COURT: Mr. Means? 
4 MR. MEANS: Ygur Honor, I'm going to move 
5 that the Court issue an order or acquittal based on 
6 the evidence you've heard so far, without need for the 
7 defendant to put on a defense. 
8 The reason I'm going to do that is that he's 
9 been charged with an offense that under Section 76-5-
10 109, which says that he is charged with "intentionally 
11 and knowingly inflicting a physical injury upon 
12 Malcolm Bailey, or having the care and custody of that 
13 child, caused or permitted another to inflict physical 
14 injury upon the child," and you've had no evidence 
15 whatsoever of any physical injury. 
16 MR. ROMNEY: May I respond to that, your 
17 Honor? 
18 THE COURT: Yes, sir. 
19 MR. ROMNEY: Definitionally in the Section 
20 76-5-109 (1) (b) subsection (4) -- first in the 
21 proceeding subsection defines physical injury as a 
22 condition which impairs physical -- "an injury to or 
23 condition of the child impairing physical condition, 
24 including a bruise, a laceration, an abrasion, failure 
25 to thrive or malnutrition, or" -- and this is the 
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subsection we are going under -- "any other condition 
which imperils the child's health or welfare,,! and 
which is not a serious physical injury is defined in 
this section. 
Certainly the holding of a child --a nine 
month old child over a railing 2 0 or 3 0 feet above the 
ground constitutes that condition imperiling a child's 
health or welfare. There can be no other 
interpretation than that makes statutorily what is 
defined here. 
We submit that in fact that's what has been 
testified to, and that does constitute child abuse or 
physical injury -- it's a physical injury component of 
child abuse as defined by the legislature in this 
statute. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. MEANS: If I could, your Honor, I think 
(inaudible) defining words define injury, not 
circumstances, they define a condition to the child, 
not the overall circumstances surrounding his conduct. 
He hasn't inflicted an injury which is either a 
bruise, a laceration, an abrasion, or some other 
injury which imperils the child's physical condition. 
Not the created circumstances which might have 
imperiled the child's physical condition, but there 
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has to be a result (inaudible) injury (inaudible). 
THE COURT: Well, as I read the statute, I 
find that physical injury as defined in subsection (4) 
of that paragraph, as Mr. Romney has referred to it, 
as any other condition which imperils, and the other 
condition in this instance may well be the condition 
of placing the child over the railing, which would 
imperil the child's health or welfare. That is a 
factor of the physical injury as defined by the 
statue. I'm going to deny your motion. 
MR. MEANS: Can I have just a minute, your 
Honor? 
THE COURT: Yes, sir. 
MR. MEANS: We'd rest, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Anything from either side? 
MR. ROMNEY: Your Honor, I think we'll 
submit it. 
THE COURT: Anything else, Mr. Means? 
MR. MEANS: Submit it. 
THE COURT: Based upon the testimony before 
me, I find the defendant guilty of the charge of child 
abuse, a class A misdemeanor, as set forth in 76-5-
109. I find that the activity of the defendant with 
respect to the minor child that has been testified to 
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created a condition which imperiled the child's health 
or welfare, which under the section, would be defined 
as a physical injury. 
Under that section the penalty imposed could 
be that of a class A misdemeanor, which has been the 
charge filed in the crime against Mr. Cannon. 
Comments? 
MR. ROMNEY: You haven't arrived at 
sentencing, your Honor. When you get there may I 
(inaudible)? 
THE COURT: I'm there. 
MR. ROMNEY: Your Honor, in speaking with 
Sergeant Hodgson -- and I'm looking at Mr. Cannon's 
criminal history --he was charged in May of 1996 with 
rape of a child, and speaking with the sergeant, the 
judicial resolution shows none or no information 
available. I had to rely on Sergeant Hodgson, whose 
recollection is that he is on probation for that. I 
believe he's been convicted either of that or a lesser 
charge. I think it's appropriate that he be referred 
to AP&P for presentence report. 
THE COURT: I intend to make the referral, 
thank you. 
Mr. Means, would you and your client come 
forward, please? 
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MR. MEANS: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Means, would you discuss 
with your client on the record the necessity to 
continue sentencing for the purpose of the referral? 
MR. MEANS: Yes, your Honor. 
Mr. Cannon, you have a right to be sentenced 
no sooner than two days from today, no longer than 45 
days from today. The Court has indicated that he 
desires that you participate in a presentence 
evaluation. You might have done one of those before. 
If you have, you know that that may take longer than 
45 days. 
MR. CANNON: All right. 
MR. MEANS: Do you consent that your 
sentencing can be pronounced at a time longer than 45 
days from today? 
MR. CANNON: Yes. 
MR. MEANS: We'll waive it, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. I find that the 
defendant has agreed to have sentencing continued and 
waives the opportunity of immediate sentence. 
I'm going to refer Mr. Cannon to the Adult 
Probation and Parole office in Provo, Utah, for the 
purpose of participating in the preparation of a 
presentence report that will be submitted to this 
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Court. Sentencing is set for what date? 
COURT CLERK: February 23rd at 9 o'clock. 
THE COURT: Nine a.m. on that date of 2/23, 
Mr. Cannon, you are to be present. You are to contact 
the Adult Probation and Parole office within seven 
days of today's date. Please cooperate with them 
fully. 
For your information, if you fail to 
participate with them as you need to, and I get a 
report back saying that the report is not ready 
because you failed to cooperate, then I'll place you 
in custody until we get the report done and until the 
sentencing is taken care of. You understand? 
MR. CANNON: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right, sign your promise to 
appear right here on the document that the clerk has, 
and then you're free to go. 
MR. ROMNEY: Thank you, your Honor. 
MR. MEANS: Thank you, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Means. 
(Hearing concluded) 
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
I, Beverly Lowe, a Notary Public in and for the 
State of Utah, do hereby certify: 
That the foregoing proceedings were transcribed 
under my direction from the electronic tape recording 
made of these proceedings. 
That this transcript is full, true, and correct 
and contains all of the evidence, all of the 
objections of Counsel and rulings of the Court and all 
matters to which the same relate which were audible 
through said tape recording. 
I further certify that I am not interested in the 
outcome thereof. 
That certain parties were not identified in the 
record, and therefore the name associated with the 
statement may not be the correct name as to the 
speaker. 
WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL this 12th day of 
June 1998. 
My commission expires: 
February 24, 2000 
^ > 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
residing in Utah County 
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